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ting a "proigate" Greek state but to avoiding the writedowns of bad
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1 Introduction
A decade since the beginning of the Great Recession, and the accute economic crisis
a­ icting the Eurozone countries does not abate. The economic malaises of the neoliberal1
market economy that were exposed by the nancial meltdown in 2008 have been amplied
by draconian austerity measures that the "structuralists"2 have imposed in the common
currency area. Fiscal retrenchment programmes were presumed to deal with what has
been commonly framed as a sovereign debt problem. In the process, real GDP in the
most deeply a¤ected ountries remains substantially below pre-crisis levels, leading them
into a depression. Real GDP is -23.3% (Greece), -7.1% (Italy), -6.4% (Spain), and -2.9%
(Ireland) below its respective 2008 levels (source: Eurostat 2014). The result is an ever
more serious social and political crisis: Greece and Spain su¤er from huge unemployement
rates in excess of 25%, while youth unemployement hovers around the 50% mark.
Arguably, macroeconomic indicators have recently improved in countries like Ireland
and Spain (and in the Eurozone as a whole mainly as a result of the European
Central Banks (ECB) quantitative easing monetary policies) but, whatever tem-
porary rebound is evidenced through dry statistics, it is plagued by ve, in our view, main
characteristics of 21st century neoliberal capitalism: (i) Rising economic and social
inequality which increases the marginalisation of large sectors of national pop-
ulations and concentrates even more forms of capital within certain geographic
regions and among certain groups, a phenomenon of uneven spatial develop-
ment ( Harvey (2005)) ; (ii) Increased propensity to crisis and secular stagnation (as
described by A. Hansen, see below) with the explosive nancialization of the capital ac-
cummulation process; (iii) Business concentration, hoarding of cash reserves and lack of
productive investment by big companies; (iv) Casualization of the labour force ("Gig"
underclass of labourers, "Uberization", impoverished middle class; and (v) Hollowing-out
of democratic institutions.
The aim of this study is to revisit and reexamine key economic data following the in-
ception of the Euro for Greece, the undisputed "guinea pig" of the "Alice in Wonderland"
economics of austerianism. Given that since 2010, turbo charged scal consol-
idation is being undersigned by debt fundamentalists through 3 consecutive
bailout plans (see Karanasos et al. (2017) for details) as the prime remedy
for the tumultuous state of the Greek economy, a fresh assessment is needed
for its geoeconomic impact and e¢ cacy. Two are our main contributions:
First, we present new evidence about the composition of the soaring Greek
1For details, see the discussion in Section 2.
2We refer to as "structuralists" the dominant Eurozone neoliberal policy makers that believe, out of
ideological conviction, that whatever the economic problem, structural reform, deregulation, and scal
exibility in framing the future steps of austerity, will grow ailing economies stronger.
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sovereign liabilities and, crucially, of the unsettling utilization of the "troica"
(IMF, European Union, ECB) loans. We demonstrate that the vast bulk of
the loans went overwhelmingly not to beneting a "proigate" Greek state but
to avoiding the writedowns of bad loans made by reckless creditors (mainly
German and French banks) to the Greek government and Greek systemic
banks. We view this destabilizing conduct by the Eurozones economic elites
as a form of what Harvey(2005) terms as accumulation by dispossession: "By
[accumulation of dispossession] I mean the continuation and proliferation of
accumulation practices which Marx had treated of as primitiveor original
during the rise of capitalism. These include...colonial, neocolonial, and im-
perial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources)...and
usury, the national debt and, most devastating of all the use of the credit
system as a radical means of accumulation by dispossession"(p.159).
Second, we propound a concrete alternative plan with a number of in-
terconnected and synergistic actions that will alleviate the Greek crisis, will
avert the dissolution of the Eurozone and shake discredited neoliberal beliefs
and economic functioning. Our key proposal is the temporary adoption of a
parallel (to the Euro) currency whilst, crucially, Greece remains formally a
Eurozone member. A complementary currency may be pertinent not only for
Greece but for other troubled nations within the Eurozone, foremost Italy,
given the state of its economy and of its ailing banking system.
We acknoweldge that the synergistic forces behind the genesis and the unfolding of
the Eurozone crisis are extremely deep-seated ranging from over-accummulation, surplus
absorption, monopolization and the nancialization of the capital formation process that
characterize the world economic system to Eurozone specicities.
For the present analysis, we employ Peck, Theodore, and Brenners (2012)
understanding of neoliberalism as market disciplinary regulatory restructur-
ing. Crucially, it is this disciplinary impulse that, in Polanyis model, gives
the Euro project its chimerical character, due to the political impossibility
of allowing the societies of the member states to be transformed into heap
of ruins (Polanyi (1944[2001], pp.202) by the sanction of hunger (Polanyi
(1944[2001], pp.123), although both testaments are tested to the limit in the
case of Greece. The result is an inevitable coupling of market disciplinary
reforms (e.g., the inception of the Euro) to the growth of nancial backstop-
ping institutions which provide state-funded security (e.g., European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), European Stability Fund (ESF)), in other words an ex-
pansion of big-government nance under the auspices of small-government
ideology, in an escalating cycle of crisis and crisis interventions.
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In recent related work, Hatgioannides, Karanassou and Sala (2013, 2017) addressed
in detail the Eurozones woes and the prospect of secular stagnation (see below) in the
common currency area by unravelling (i) the supply-side imbalances that formed the
core-periphery economic divide, and (ii) the necessity of the peripherys sovereign debt
to nance imports from the export-led core. Since in a monetary union, a member state
cannot devalue to boost its exports and put a brake on its imports, it is the scal budget
balance that will have to ll up the gap left out by private and external sectors; hence the
exlosion of sovereign debt in parts of the periphery and the need of debt "mutualization".
The prevailing view that countries of the core have funded the sovereign debts of the
periphery was thus challenged, and subsequently it was demonstrated that the commonly
held argument that the periphery countries (rst and foremost Greece) have lived beyond
their means -due to wages growing beyond what is justied by productivity gains- is in
stark contrast to the trajectories followed by the wage shares. In addition, they provided
evidence that intra-euro mercantilism was forming the salient economic project during
the booming times 2001-2007 of the monetary union.
They further scrutinized the credit ows , the role of FIRE (nance, insurance and
real estate) as a major source of economic stimulus by partially soaking up surplus capital
and the role of the ECB in creating an asymetric monetary union. During the pre-2008
period, it was shown that the main booming private enterprise of the recently deemed
as troubled countries of the periphery was a rampant nancial sector fuelling a multi-
facet credit bubble. A bubble that was funding the unsustainable purchase of goods from
the exporting core and the explosion in speculative property construction. At the same
time, the private sector agents (banks, insurance companies, pension funds) of the richer
and higher saving core, funnelled huge money ows to the poorer periphery. As this
investment decision was driven by their quest for boosting short-term protability, it had
a destabilizing impact on the allocation of scarce resources at the recipient states. During
the ongoing austerity era, the very same private institutions are reversing former and
reckless cross-border investments. The credit draught in the periphery, the di¤erences in
the funding costs of core/periphery states, were found to be symptoms of the concurrent
attempts by surplus countries private creditors to repatriate the massive opportunistic
claims they have accumulated on decit countries debtors.
As early as 1938, the leading Keynesian economist in the US Alvin H. Hansen dubbed
the term secular stagnation: According to this theory, the modern developed capital-
ist economy has an enormous capacity to save, both because of its corporate structure
and because of the very unequal distribution of personal income. But if adequate prof-
itable investment opportunities are lacking, this saving potential translates not into real
capital formation and sustained growth but into lowered income, mass unemployment,
and chronic depression, a condition summed up in the term stagnation(see Sweezy and
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Magdo¤ (2009/1987), pp.30). Secular stagnation might "prove the New Normal".3With
reference to the world economy, both Summers (2013, ibid) and Krugman (2013, ibid)
are adamant that what is needed is increased spending of all kinds to get the economies
moving again, initially through expanded government expenditure, but with the object of
jump-starting private investment spending
If, or rather when (in our opinion) should the current disastrous policies perpetuate,
Eurozone goes into stagnation, there are many problems endemic to this block of countries;
most notably, that this is one region of the world where "rules" have triumphed over even
mainstream economic pragmatism (see Stockhammer and Sotiropoulos (2014)), forcing
to pointless cuts in government spending. It is the cobwebbed, yet conicting,
dynamics of structuralism (see Footnote 2) and an obsession with the "rules"
that shape the contradictory and geographically uneven institutionalization of
the political project of neoliberal integration in the Eurozone.
Conceptually, the tendencies toward neoliberalization, nancial marketiza-
tion and, ultimatelely, economic integration in the common currency block
of countries are conditioned by a Polyanian ([1944]2001) "double movement".
This is driven, on the one hand, by an overarching laissez faire ideology and
the concommitant impulses of market discipline and pursuit of economic op-
portunity at the European/global level, and on the other, the pressures these
impulses create for the institutionalized protection of social security and na-
tional sovereignty. As noted by Polanyi ([1944]2001), internal and external,
social and national protectionism [tend] to fuse(pp. 213) Haberly and Wo-
jcik (2017) observed that the latter "countermovement" aspect of the double
movement mentioned above is often less driven by conscious political opposi-
tion to neoliberalization, than an ad-hoc dynamic of elite cognitive dissonance
within the implementation of neoliberalism. For the Eurozone in particular,
the rolling back of state intervention via nancial deregulation is paradoxi-
cally leading to increased central intervention (European Unions commision
in Brussels and other state funded bodies such as ESM/ ESF) in nancial
bailouts of countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland and the ECBs ex-
pansion and dominant role in both bailouts and quantitative easing monetary
policies.
3See Lawrence Summers (2013). Another leading Neo-Keynensian, Paul Krugman (2013) picked up
Summerss comments arguing that "an economy facing secular stagnation...isnt just a temporary state
of a¤airs, its the norm". As Magdo¤ and Foster (2014) point out, "Neither Summers nor Krugman o¤er
a theoretical or historical explanation for secular stagnation. Instead they focus simply on the liquidity
trap in which interest rates approach zero-making it di¢ cult to stimulate the economy monetarily by
further lowering rates", ibid, pp.2. In a footnote, they carry on noting that "Hansens theory is discussed
by Krugman as if it merely emphasized demographic factors, not issues such as industrial maturity,
monopoly and inequality", ibid , footnote 7, pp. 23.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reects on the
concept of neoliberalism and sheds light on the dynamics and contradictions of
neoliberalization processes observed in the Eurozone. In Section 3, we evaluate
the trajectories of main macroeconomic indicators for Greece before and, primarily, after
the onslaught of the debt crisis in 2010. In Section 4, we present new evidence
about the composition of the Greek debt and most importantly the utilization of the
troica (IMF, European Union and the ECB) loans. Section 5 outlines our proposals
for a temporary resolution of the Greek crisis, notably with the adoption of a parallel
(to the Euro currency), whilst, crucially, Greece remains formally a Eurozone member.
Section 6 reminds the eerie similarity of Greece to that of Germany in the interwar
period. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Neoliberalism and Neoliberalization Processes in
the Eurozone
Our current phase of capitalism is underpinned by a much used but loosely
understood economic and political philosophy called neoliberalism. Brenner
et al. (2010) correctly observe that neoliberalism "has become something of
a rascal concept-promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently dened, empir-
ically imprecise and frequently contested" (pp.184). At the same time, the
ongoing Eurozones economic crisis has added still greater urgency to debates
around the polysemic nature of neoliberalism and its internal contradictions.
Divergent interpretations of neoliberalism-its histories, its geographies, its cri-
sis tendencies and its trajectories-are generating radically divergent diagnoses
of the present geoeconomic conjuncture, the ongoing transformation of regu-
latory formations at all spatial scales and the possibilities for alternatives to
the market-based economic order (see Brand and Sekler (2009), Peck et al.
(2009)).
Neoliberalism was rst introduced by M.Friedman in Latin America in the
70s and was subsequently established in the early 80s, in the US during the
tenure of presidentR.Reagan and in the UK by prime minister M.Thatcher.
In turn, the Anglo-American economies at the heart of global nance were
treated by the majority of the other mature economies as a black box of
market fundamentalism lled with caricatured liberal and/or market-based
institutions, which were presumed to act as the default template for global
economic restructuring.
Broadly speaking, neoliberalism is a project that reduces all human activities to "homo
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economicus", redenes democracy beyond the narrow connes of elections as a kind of
market rationality-and the only criterion to judge our political class by is how successful
they are in "marketizing" human relationships and the commons (pasture land, woodland,
water supply). It is evident that neoliberalism has lately started to undermine the very
institutions with which the capitalist establishment has traditionally been identied- the
legal system, the police, parliament, local government. Under the earlier forms of liberal
democracy these could be counted on to play a moderately autonomous role in tempering
capitalism. Under neoliberalism they are increasingly shaped so that they will not be
obstacles to market priorities, especially when the latter are servile to the interests of big
business.
More specically, in heterodox political economy and within the eld of eco-
nomic geography in particular, there are two key perspectives on neoliberal-
ism4: The rst is a Marxian perspective which views the ostensible ideological
goals of neoliberalism as mostly a smoke screen for a project of capitalist class
power restoration, that sees to rip down institutional and political barriers
to the development of new ones, and full exploitation of existing investment
opportunities. The second perspective is a broadly Polyanian one with links
to institutional regulation school-in particular Veblens original ideas of evo-
lutionary institutional change-and "varieties of capitalism work". Whereas
Marxists view the ideological contradictions and hypocrisies of neoliberalism
as evidence that ideology is of secondary importance to class interests, the
Polyanians argue that these contradictions are largely produced by the di-
alectic between a genuine elite commitment to the market-oriented "liberal
creed" (like J.M. Keynes, they believe that economic ideas matter), and the
practical constraints, tensions and crises that emerge whenever an attempt
is made to remodel an already existing human society to the dictates of this
creed.
Harvey (2005) is arguably the leading exponent of the Marxian tradition.
Neoliberalism, according to Harvey, is the intensication of the inuence and
dominance of capital5; it is the elevation of capitalism, as a mode of produc-
4We are very thankful to the detailed, thorough and thought-provoking comments of an anonymous
referee. We are incorporating them freely in this Section.
5Harveys(2005) analysis stems from Marxs insight about the nature of capital itself. Capital is
not simply money, property, or one economic variable among others. Rather, capital is the organising
principle of modern society. It should be recalled that, in his Grundrisse, Marx explicitly argued that
capital is a process that puts into motion all of the other dimensions of modern economic, political,
social and cultural life. It creates the wage system, inuences values, goals, and the ethics of individuals,
transforms our relation to nature, to ourselves, to our community, and constantly seeks to mold state
imperatives until they are in harmony with its own. Neoliberalism is therefore not a new turn in the
history of capitalism. It is more simply, and more perniciously, its intensication, and its resurgence after
decades of opposition from the Keynesian welfare state and from experiments with social democratic and
state politics.
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tion, into an ethic, a set of political imperatives, and a cultural logic. It is also
a project: a project to strengthen, restore, or, in some cases, constitute anew
the power of economic elites. The creation of the Euro as the shared cur-
rency for the majority of the European Union members is, in our view, such
a project. Harvey argues that the global expansion of capital is premised on
what he terms accumulation by dispossession. This concept argues that ac-
cummulation under globalisation continues to expand by dispossessing people
of their economic rights and of various forms of ownership and economic power.
It is highly relevant to structural adjustment policies imposed in the Eurozone
such as privatization and the prioritization of bondholder repayment at the
expense of brutal forms of austerity, in particular for highly indebted countries
such as Greece. Accummulation by dispossession also includes ...the conver-
sion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into
exclusive private property rights;...commodication of labor power and the
supression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption
(p.159) and ...the dimunition or erasure of various forms of common prop-
erty rights (such as state pensions, paid vacations, and access to education and
health care (p.160). The latter observations are highly relevant to Greece
under the 3 consecutive bailout plans as we shall show in Section 3.
There are three particularly important aspects of the second perspective
on neoliberalism.
First is what Polanyi described as the "double novement" in which the mar-
ket impulse toward marketization ultimately buckles under the weight of the
institutions that protect society from the market6. In Polanyis ([1944]2001)
analysis, Nineteenth Century capitalism was rooted in four institutions -the
liberal state, balance-of-power geopolitics, the gold standard, and the ideology
of the market- with haute nance functioning as a permanent agency of the
most elastic kind, and the myth of the self regulating economy serving as the
systems "common matrix". Todays "common matrix" has plenty of echoes
of its Nineteenth Century forebear, being structured around the historically
distinctive intersection of neoliberalization, nancialization and a host of new
political-economic geographies such as the Eurozone. Polanyi noted that the
fact that the "self-regulating" market could, by denition, never be imple-
mented in any sort of pure, unadulterated form in an actually existing human
society meant that proponents of liberalization could always that any socio-
6In contrast, in a Veblenian "double movement", a predominantly Darwinian evolutionary impulse
buckles under the weight of the institutions that protect the market from society-with society understood
broadly to refer to the entire array of actually existing human limitations and idionsyncrasies. Haberly
and Wojcik attempt a very imteresting fusion of both Polyanian and Veblenian "double movements".
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economic prob;ems in existing liberalizing policies were a result of their not
yet having gone far enough due to mainly, self-serving political obstruction by
vested interests.
In his original work, Polyani also argued that a commitment to the Gold
Standard (see also Section 6) became, from the mid-19th to early 20th century,
the primary ideological motor of the "double movement", with elites being so
obsessed with preserving it as the core institution of global/liberal-based civ-
ilization that they, ironically, constructed a massive cobweb of interventionist
tools in an e¤ort to salvage it (e.g., Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010), ne-
oliberalism is also characterized by a counterintuitive and perverse dynamic
whereby its continued expansion is actually fueled by its own catastrophic
failures7mercantilist and protectionist trade policies, colonial empire-building
and elaborate networks of inter-central bank loans) that ultimately proved
to be fundamentally conct-ridden and unsustainable. As we shall argue in
Section 5, the pretence of irreversibility is what distinguishes a true monetary
union from a xed-exchange rate system with a shared currency. The recent
developments in the Eurozone and in particular, the stance of the elites of
the European Union and the ECB towards moribund member states such as
Greece pause an existential threat to the incumbent form of monetary union
and raise serious doubts about the feasibility of the much aspired closer eco-
nomic integration.
Secondly, as noted by . Only very recently (in early January 2018), the
highest rank o¢ cers of two out of the three "troica" members, such as Jeroen
Dijsselbloem (President of the Eurogroup from 21 January 2013 until 12 Jan-
uary 2018, and President of the Board of Governors of the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) from 11 February 2013 until 12 January 2018) and Chris-
tine Lagarde (Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
since July 2011) publicly acknowledged that the bailout loans for Greece were
ill-designed, unt to reignite its ailing economy; instead they have created
an accute socioeconomic crisis. The bailout loans, they plainly admitted,
were only susseccful in rescuing -collapsing at the height of the crisis in 2010-
mainly, German and French, private sector banks (for details see Section 5).
Thirdly, Peck and Theodore (2007) engaged with the "varieties of capital-
7Brenner et al. (2010) write "For reasons that deserve more systematic exploration elsewhere, policy
failure is central to the explaratory and experimental modus operandi of neoliberalization processes-
it is an important impetus for their continual reinvention and ever-widening interspatial circulation.
Indeed, rather than causing market-oriented regultory projects to be abandoned, endemic policy failure
has tended to spur further rounds of reform within broadly neoliberalized political and institutional
parameters. Ironically, the chronic "underperformance" of neoliberal strategies has been a source of
forward momentum for the project as a whole" pp.209.
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ism" school which, since its origins in the early 1990s has been consolidated
into one of the most infuential strands in comparative and heterodox political
economy. They elaborated on the contradictory dynamics of neoliberal market
institutionalization showing that are "variegated", i.e., interdependent across
space between institutionally and politically diverse processes of market in-
stitutionalization occuring within and across multiple countries, localities and
regions. Lim (2010) applies the variegated capitalism approach to the inter-
national dynamic of institution building and interdependence surrounding the
macroeconomic imbalances between the US and China.
Very pertinent for our present assessment of the economic architecture of
the Eurozone and the ascension of Germany as its supreme engine via what
we have called in recent related work (Hatgioannides et al. (2017)) as intra-
Eurozone neo-mercantilism, is the critique made by Peck and Theodore
(2007) that while the "varieties" approach has served as a potent foil against
the orthodox globalization thesis, its alternative vision of a bipolar global
economy comprising two competing capitalisms was found by the authors to
be wanting.
As Peck and Theodore (2007) observe, in rejecting a monolithic concep-
tion of capitalism, Albert ([1991]1993) identied amidst the global economys
patchwork complexity two diverging currents-a boisterous, neoliberal strand
epitomized by the US in the post-Reagan period, pitched against a formidable,
but somewhat disarticulated Rhinish model: With the collapse of commu-
nism, it is as if a veil had been suddenly lifted from our eyes. Capitalism,
we can now see, has two faces, two personalities. the neo-American model is
based on individual success and short-term nancial gain; the Rhine model,
of German pedigree but with strong Japanese connections, emphasizes col-
lective success, consensus and long-term concerns. In the last decade or so,
it is the Rhine model-unheralded, unsung and lacking even nominal identity
papers-that has sworn itself to be the more e¢ cient of the two, as well as the
more equitable(Albert, ibid, pp.18).
The challenge, in the coming ideological battle, was for European politi-
cians, especially of Germany, to assert the social and economic superiority
of their underrated system in the face of a rapacious and insidious competi-
tor willing to sacrice the future for the present, seizing short-term and
selective gains at the expense of the formation of an inner "Third World"
of American-style urban blight on the outskirts of Manchester or Lyons or
Naples(Albert, idid, pp.259-60).
The subsequent neoliberal (neo-American in Alberts terms) economic
10
ascendancy of the 1990s and the faltering of the German coordinated market
economy (Rhinish in Alberts terms) at the same time, bestowed new le-
gitimacy on (ostensibly) free-market forms of capitalism. A singular world of
millennial capitalism, market unication and institutional convergence seemed
to beckon with the creation of the Euro circa 1999.
As early as 2003, the German political and economic establishments led by
the socialist (of the SPD party) chancellor Gerhard Schroder pre-emptively
unleashed the (in)famous "Agenda 2010" of structural labour market reforms
(which will be subsequently propagated by the "structuralists" across the
entire Eurozone). Deregulation, freeze of nominal wages and salaries, and
the slushing of social security, the indirect wage 8 and pensions were the
top priorities. Domestic demand was thus suppressed due to the fall of the
living standards for the majority of the population, and "competitiveness" (the
wage-productivity gap in our reading of the term) was boosted mainly inside
the Eurozone. At the same time, German non-nancial corporates (NFCOs)
have been the undisputed champions among private rms of member states
on both Return on Capital and Return on Equity measures9.
Figure 1 depicts the falling labour share and rising protability of NF-
COs (Figure 1a), and the associated trade-balance positions of the German
economy with the countries in the Eurozone periphery (Figures 1b-d).
8The terms of employment (or indirect wage) are associated with the existence of a national health
system, state pension, benets system, the time it takes to re-establish benets, strings attached to receive
benets, minimum wage, and progression opportunities.
9See Hatgioannides et al. (2017) for comprehensive evidence of the protability of NFCOs across the
Eurozone members.
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Figure 1. Germanys growing protability.
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Table 1 shows that the trade balance of Germany to the EU15 member
states almost doubled over the early 2001-05 period of the monetary unions
life ratifying Germanys neo-mercantilistic avenue for the economic domi-
nation of the Eurozone.
Table 1. Germanys trade balance (net exports of goods)
to the European Union (15 countries), e billion.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
26.0 36.3 42.0 51.5 68.4 76.4 87.2 87.0 84.7
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
106.6 86.5 67.1 63.0 51.8 45.9 43.1 52.4 69.1
Source: Eurostat.
At the end of 2017, Germanys economy is the envy of the Eurozone. Growth
hit a ve-year high; a surge in exports produced the biggest trade surplus
of the postwar era. The inception of the Euro together with Agenda 2010-
overhaul of the welfare and labour laws- tranformed Germany from the "sick
man" of Europe in the 1990s into its economic powerhouse. The traditional
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German-style coordinated capitalism has nally succumbed to the teleology of
the neoliberal institutional monoculture for the regulation of economic a¤airs
Martin Schulz, leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Germany
since March 2017, the former (between 2012-2017) President of the European
Parliament, and a potential member of a new grand coalition to govern Ger-
many from early 2018, has challenged the triumphant reading of the state of
the German economy, declaring that gains in e¢ ciency through Agenda 2010
had come at the expense of social solidarity, pledging to make social justice
and robust social security central aims of economic policy. He is addressing
well-founded concerns over the predicament of Germanys labour market. De-
spite o¢ cial records showing that unemployement is at its lowest level since
the reunication of the late 1980s, a rapidly increasing prevalence of xed-
term contracts and a growing proportion of the workforce earning low wages
make Germany similar to the intrinsically unequal Anglo-Saxon economies.
It is a sign of optimism which may herald the dawn of major policy shifts
that the articulation of a victorious and unitary mode of capitalism is chal-
lenged by the emergence of a critical countercurrent (in mainstream politics)
in Eurozones most puissant economy.
3 The Impact of Austerity Programmes in Greece
The ailing Greek economy, the rst Eurozone member to fall in the spring of 2010 under
the troica of lendersstranglehold and implement the voodoo economics of austerianism,
is in the midst of a 1930s-scale Great Depression with a cumulative reduction of its GDP
-during 2008 to 2015- around 25% (see Figure 2).
It is important to note that GDP is a particularly inappropriate measure of the real
fall in economic welfare. Given that the current account balance was minus 15% of GDP
in the third quarter of 2008, and has been in suprlus since the second half of 2013, it
means that spending by Greeks on goods and services has fallen by a minimum of 40%.
The cyclically-adjusted scal balance improved by 20% of GDP between 2008 and 2014,
while government employment fell by 30% between 2009 and 2014. Two ill-conceived
bailout plans (the rst in 2010 and the second in 2012) accompanied by self-defeating
economic recipies have resulted in o¢ cial unemploymemt of 26% (see Figure 3a) and
youth unemployment at over 50% (see Figure 3b).
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Figure 2. GDP per capita. 1995-2015.
a. Growth rates (percent) b. Index 100 = 2008
Source: Eurostat (data extracted on: 14.09.16).
Figure 3. Unemployment (percent of active population). 1998-2015.
a. Total b. Youth (less than 25 years)
Source: Eurostat (data extracted on: 14.09.16).
Figure 4a plots the level of trust that consumers have towards the Greek economy.
The steep downward trend shows that the consumerscondence in Greece after 2010 fell
sharply, which had a signicantly negative impact on private consumption (see Figure
4b).
Figure 4. Consumer sentiment and private nal consumption expenditure. 2005-2016.
a. Monthly consumer condence index b. Private nal consumption expenditure (index 100= 2008)
Source: European Commission and Eurostat (data extracted on: 14.09.16).
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Figure 5 shows the collapse of private sectors credit ow and foreign direct investment
in Greece since 2010.
Figure 5. Credit ows and foreign direct investments. Greece, 1995-2015.
a. Private sector credit ow (percent of GDP) b. Stock of foreign direct investment (millions of euros)
Source: Eurostat (data extracted on: 14.09.16) and Bank of Greece.
Finally, Figure 6 depicts the self-reported unmet needs for medical examinations (in-
cluding all ages, both male and female, as a share of medical visits) and the percentage of
the people that face the risk of poverty and social exclusion (increased from around 28%
in 2010 to more than 35% since 2013), demonstrating the serious social consequences of
the austerity programmes.
Figure 6. Healthcare access and poverty risk. Greece, 2003-2015.
a. Self-reported unmet needs for medical
examination by income quintile (percent
of total visits). Reason: Too expensive.
b. People at risk of poverty or social
exclusion (percent of total population)
Source: Eurostat (data extracted on: 14.09.16).
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4 The Reality About the Composition and Use of
Greek Debt
Exotix (a boutique brokerage that specialises in illiquid markets), reorted that the much
heralded spring/summer 2012 Private Sector Involvement Initiative (PSI) which restruc-
tured e200bn of the Greek government bonds debt pile, had still left about e62bn (ap-
proximately 31% of the wilting Greek GDP in 2012) of bonds of varying maturities held
by private investors. Collectively known as the "strip", these bonds (in November 2012)
were trading at an average price of 25 cents on the euro. Interestingly, in response to
the "bad" idea of bond buybacks, entertained by Eurozone o¢ cials (who wanted to avoid
inevitable decisions on their own loans) on how to tackle Greeces ominous debt trajec-
tory, hedge funds were investing in the strip with the expectation of sheer proteering
should a future buyback be tabled.10 Approximately 8bn Euros was accounted by the
"international law" bonds held by the private sector that have been exempted from the
2012 restructuring, as it could have triggered a series of lawsuits by the hedge funds in
possession.
Greek banks disposed of almost 30bn Euros of "new bonds" in December 2012 in a
buyback scheme agreed with international lenders that reduced the countrys debt by
around 20bn Euros, still hold the bulk of the short-term debt , amounting to some 15bn
Euros in Treasury bills, which were rolled over in monthly auctions before even this funding
facility of the Greek state was curtailed by the ECB in 2015 (having reached the upper
allowed threshold). Greeces four systemic banks are understood to hold 2bn Euros of new
bond issuances and another 4-5bn Euros of new bnds created after the 2012 debt swap.
In total, private sector investors hold around 15% of the countries debt burden. Those
include investors such as Capital Group that hold restructured debt, and fund managers
such as Carmignac-Gestion that took part in the ssale of new debt, as well as investors
who held international law bonds and refused to take part in the 2012 debt swap.
Despite the collosal (as a % of GDP and outstanding debt) restructuring which in
reality destroyed the assets (held in the form of government bonds) of the main pension
funds and erroded the wealth of small to medium treasury bond investors, Greeces debt
burden miraculously increased and surpassed in 2014 the 180% of the countrys GDP (see
Figure 7).
10The Financial Times (2012, December 18) reported that Third Point One of the worlds most
prominent hedge funds is sitting on a $500m prot after making a bet that Greece would not be forced
to leave the eurozone, ...[it] tendered the majority of a $1bn position in Greek government bonds, built
up only months earlier, as part of a landmark debt buyback deal by Athens on Monday [December 17],
... The Greek government swapped holdings of its own debt for notes issued by one of the eurozones
rescue facilities at a value of 34 cents on the euro. Third Point had scooped up holdings of Greek debt
earlier this year for just 17 cents on the euro.
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Figure 7. Public sector imbalances (percent of GDP). 1995-2015.
a. Gross general government debt b. General government net lending (+) /net borrowing (-)
Source: Eurostat (data extracted on: 14.09.16).
As of the beginning of 2015, Greeces estimated e317bn of sovereign liabilities is
overwhelmingly owned to the troica of international lenders (approximately e270bn) with
an approximate breakdown shown in Table 2 below:
Table 2. Estimated Greek sovereign liabilities at the end of 2014.
Lender Amount
EFSF e142 bn
Market Debt (ECB and other Central Banks) e54 bn
European Union bilateral loans e53 bn
Market debt (non Central Banks) e27 bn
IMF e24 bn
Other lenders e17 bn
Total e317 bn
Source: Own calculations based on information supplied by the Hellenic Republic
Debt Bulletin and the IMF.
It seems like that since the crisis hit, the rest of the Eurozone and the IMF have
been extraordinarly altruistic to Greece. Was it so? A reality check shows an unsettling
utilization of the troica loans (and own Greek nancing, albeit relatively small, through
the issuance of short-term Treasury bills) for the 2010-15 period of two successive, yet
ill-conceived, bailout plans: Out of a total of e254.4 bn, the sum of e226.7 bn were
loans supplied by the Eurozone and the IMF (about 125% of Greeces 2015Q1 GDP). The
breakdown of where the money actually went is striking and is shown in Table 3 below:
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Table 3. Use of cumulated Greek loans in 2010-2014.
Use Amount
Maturing debt obligations e81.3 bn
Recapitalisation of Greek banks e48.2 bn
Debt reduction e45.9 bn
Interest payments e40.6 bn
State operating needs e27 bn
Repayments to IMF e9.1 bn
Contributions to the ESM e2.3 bn
Total e254.4 bn
Source: Own calculations based on information supplied by the IMF
Macropolis, Thompson Reuters Datastream.
Clearly, the vast bulk of the loans went overwhelmingly not to beneting a "proigate"
Greek state11 but to avoiding the writedowns of bad loans by reckless creditors (mainly,
German and French banks) to the Greek government and Greek banks. In a word, money
came in and owed out again from Greece for bailing out, indirectly through Greeks state
liabilities, private creditors. We can only ponder as to why the Greek crisis is still proled
as a debt crisis.
July 2015 seals an immolation of Greece: In exchange of what is called a third "bailout"
(potentially worth e80-85bn)- in reality is the imposition of new debts to pay existing
creditors- the Greek state must hand over e50bn of public assets to an "independent"
privatisation fund. On top of that, more austerity has to be injected into a shrinking
economy and any legislation passed in the Greek parliament that is deemed unsuitable by
the Eurozones overlords has to be reversed. At present, outlandish and unconstitutional
additional "contingency measures" worth e3.6bn are asked by IMF in particular to be
triggered in the event that Greece fails to meet its onerous scal targets.
A capitulated Greece would be turned into an economic "protectorate", one purred,
where all the decisions would be taken by foreign governments, unelected European Union
bureaucrats and self-styled technocrats. Greece becomes the locus where liberal, progres-
sive illusions are to be shattered.
11A mere 11% of the total loans directly nanced government activities in a country that does not have
access to international markets since the spring of 2010.
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5 Proposals for a Temporary Resolution of the Greek
Crisis
The iminent question is how to sustain and rebuild the Greek economy, crucially without
exiting the Eurozone; a country that has no access in the markets for raising debt, has
to confront the bailout creditors and abandon their economic illiterate programme for
lunatic scal adjustments until viable and sustainable aggreements are reached.12
We are extremely averse to suggestions that Greece exits the Eurozone and reverts
to a national currency , historically the drachma. Such a resolution could have been
considered and assessed back in April 2010, prior to the rst bailout plan. At present,
and after 6 years of erce austerity measures, massive internal devaluation and drop
of living standards, exiting the Eurozone will be just rubbing salt in deep wounds; the
whirlwind of such an action, in the short/medium run, for both the economic and social
spheres will undoubtedly be devastating. Longer run benets are also very questionable
for a relatively closed and distressed economy such as Greece.
There is another, equally important reason, that we strongly favour that Greece re-
mains, o¢ cially at least, in the Eurozone: The common currency was an outgrowth of
e¤orts that began in the mid-20th century, as Europe reeled from the carnage of two
world wars. The Euro was not just an economic project that sought to improve standards
of living by increasing the e¢ ciency of resource allocations, pursuing the principles of
comparative advantage, enhancing competition, taking advantage of economies of scale
and strenghtening economic stability. More importantly, it was a political project that
was supposed to enhance the political integration of Europe, enabling Europes historical
diversity to function e¤ectively and collectively.
It is the neoliberal economic and political elites that are failing the noble intentions of
the founders of the European Union, the common curency area and their citizens. A awed
achitecture was designed, driven by an unwavering faith in monopolistic/oligopolistic
markets of modern global capitalism , one size-ts all policies, central bank focusing
solely on ination- as opposed to the mandate of the Federal Reserve in the US, which
incorporates unemployement, growth and stability-. It is not simply that the Eurozone
is void of a set of proper institutions to accommodate Europes economic diversity; it is
rather that the structure of the Eurozone, its rules and regulations as they stand, that
12Hatgioannides et al. (2017) propose the following actions regarding the re-orientation of the Euro
and an ending to the crisis: (i) Writting-o¤ the debt of ailling member states in excess of the Maastricht
criterion of 60% of their GDP; (ii) Credible and heavy-touch auditing of the so-called SIFIs by a new
independent public pan-Eurozone body that is accountable to both national and European parliaments;
(iii) Formal and complete separation of retail and investment banking along the lines of the Glass-
Steagall Act for this part of the banking industry that managed to recapitalise itself without delving
deeply into the public purse, and (iv) Reboot the ECB and change its mandate (explicit nominal GDP
and unemployment rate targets).
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are not designed to promote growth, employement and stability for the member states.
Under this diagnosis, we proceed next to address the central question of this paper,
asked above, in a manner that not only will avert the dissolution of the Eurozone but will
also shake discredited neoliberal beliefs and economic functioning.
We propose (i) the adoption of a parallel currency13, (ii) temporary default on the
loans owed to o¢ cial creditors but servicing all private loans with the strategic objective
to regain market access in the future, (iii) nationalization of the central bank and the
systemic commercial banks, (iv) partial recapitalization of the (nationalized) commercial
banks using the newly issued currency, and (v) the introduction of capital controls.
We should stress that our ve proposals should be envisaged as a singleton and imple-
mented as a whole, since they will work synergistically in o¤ering credibility and viability
to our alternative plan.
We view the temporary default on the loans owed to o¢ cial creditors as a rightful and
economically plausible action; It is clear from Table 3 above that only a small fraction of
the debt burden of Greece during the tumultuous post 2010 period was actually used for
servicing the Greek states operating needs. O¢ cial partners in the bailout programmes
such as the IMF are also pressing for a signicant debt relief.
The systemic commercial banks are already recapitalised directly by the Greek tax-
payers to the order of 48.2 bn Euros as of the beginning of 2015, see Table 3, and by
a further 12-15 bn Euros up to the present, totalling nearly a third of the Greek GDP.
Unless one is (ideologically) convinced for an apriori private business model, formal, albeit
temporary, nationalization of the Greek banking system is duly sanctioned.
We ellaborate below on our key proposal and contribution, namely the adoption of
a parallel currency, which may be pertinent not only for Greece but for other troubled
nations within the Eurozone, foremost Italy, given the current state of its economy and
of the banking system. Historically, complementary currencies, especially in areas of
high unemployement or underemployement, were successfully implemented ever since the
Great Depression of the 1930s in the US, Canada, Western Europe and elsewhere. (for
details, see Lietaer (2001)). Complementary currencies have proved a key tool in bu¤ering
a region from the shocks caused by the failures and crises in the o¢ cial money system, as
we are evidencing today within the Eurozone, and have fuelled a cooperative "domestic"
economy operating in parallel with a competitive global economy driven by the o¢ cial
currency, namely the Euro.
In our modern take, the parallel currency would be issued in the form of govern-
13See Munchau (2015). Stiglitz (2015) also points out that an alternative way to exit the crisis might
be moving towards a dual currency circulation, using both the Euro and a "Greek Euro", a currency that
would be tradable only within the countrys own banking system. He draws also on the experience of
Argentina and the astonishing resemblances between Greece and Argentina in being choked by austerity,
experiencing rising unemployement, poverty and inmense su¤ering.
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ment IOUs denominated in Euros at a parity of one-for-one and consitute legal tender
inside Greece. At rst IOUs could be used to pay directly the public sector workers and
pensioners.
As public at, it would be a form of social relationship based upon trust ( as indeed,
every currency in the post Bretto Woods era). In order to avert inationary concerns
and discounting in a possible "black market", the issuance of IOUs will be restricted to
service the monthly payroll and would be collaterised with the stock of Euros deposited
in central/commercial banks of the country. For Greece in particular, the stock of Euros
deposited in commercial banks is in excess of 70bn Euros t present.
Liquidity would be sustained when people and companies with banking accounts use
claims on bank depositsinstead of Euro notes, which they will no longer be able to obtain
from their bank. Such deposit receipts will be the IOUs of the nationalised banking sector,
fully redeemeabe to Euros at a parity of one-for-one (should the political impasse with
the Eurozones creditors ends), and will serve as legal tender as well.
Once a parallel currency is created, the (nationalized) central bank has also to avert
hoarding. Every time someone hoards currency, by denition, its lack of circulation
deprives other people of being able to perform transactions. The more sophisticated
forms of complementary currency of the 1930s included a circulation incentive feature
recommended by Silvio Gesell.14He proposed a "stamp scrip"mechanism; the core idea was
to encourage people and companies to circulate the money through an anti-hoarding fee
(technically called "demurrage", a word dating back to the railroadspractice of charging
a fee for leaving a railroad car inactive). The back of each note, or deposit receipt in our
scheme, typically had 12 boxes (one for each month) where an o¢ cial stamp could be
a¢ xed. Any bill, to remain valid, had to have its stamps up to date.
What will be the impact on the Greek economys external position and most im-
portantly on vital imports of oil/gas and pharmaceutical products? Manageable, since
unlike the small economies of northern Europe, Greece is a relatively closed economy;
about three quarters of its GDP is domestic. Of the quarter that is not, most comes
from tourism (approximately 18% of Greek GDP in 2014) which will also bring into the
country valuable Euros and other foreign currency to nance the vital imports paid in
the o¢ cial Euro currency.15
Such an unorthodox scheme, however mountainous and courageous to implement, will
cushion the Greek economy against a total collapse, avert further capitulation together
14In 1891, Silvio Gesell described the velocity of money as a decisive fctor in determining the level of
prices, preparing the ground for Irving Fishers celebrated work of the 1920s. Two Nobel prize winners
in economics, Maurice Allais and Lawrence Klein have joined in the earlier praise by Keynes and Fisher
of Gesells contributions in monetary economics. (see Lietaer (2001).
15Euros will be exchangeable to IOUs at a parity of one-for-one and other foreign currency at market
rates. Tourists will be able to exchange any unwanted IOUs to their imported currency upon departure
from Greece.
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with the perils of internal devaluation and shake the Eurozone, and the EU by and large,
to its foundations.
There is little doubt that the wrath of the o¢ cial creditors will follow; most likely than
not, the ECB that supervises Greek banks, would view the government IOUs as "Mickey
Mouse" money, cut o¤ their liquidity through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
mechanism and potentially revoke their licences.
The irony and tragedy though is that at the end of June 2015 capital controls were
in place in Greece, commercial banks and the stock exchange were closed, citizens could
only withdraw up to e60 per day, all without the adoption of a parallel currency, just
because the ECB did (temporarily) freeze the ELA!
During a historic weekend in the 11th and 12th of July 2015, Wolfang Schauble, the
German nance minister, insisted on 5-year Greek exit from the Eurozone, a "timeout"
as he called it, that could perhaps be a better way for Greece than the proposed e86bn
bailout package. In reality, the most powerful member state pushes for the expulsion of
another, tormented one. In doing so, creditor nations reverted to the nationalist European
power struggles of the early 20th century; they demolished the idea of a monetary union
as the stepping stone towards a democratic scal and political union.
The pretence of irreversibility is what distinguishes a true monetary union from a
xed-exchange rate system with a shared currency. The coup of the 11/12th July 2015
demoted the Eurozone into the latter system, held together by the threat of absolute
destitution for those who challenge the prevailing order.
6 Déjà Vu?
The situation in the Eurozone today bears an eerie similarity to that of Europe in the
interwar period, especially when the ruling elites of the creditor countries are trapped in
similar orthodoxies to those of the post-WWI years. Ironically, Germany was then in a
similar position to that of the periphery countries, Greece in particular. It was weighted
down with its government debt because of the brutal reparations imposed at Versailles; its
banking system was undercapitalised as the result of the hyperination of the early 1920s,
and worse, it had become dependent on foreign borrowing at punitive rates. Germany
was locked into the absolutism of the gold standard, which it dared not tamper with for
fear of provoking a condence crisis. When the Great Depression hit and private markets
shut down, Germany had no choice but to impose bestial austerity with unemployment
rising to 35% and populism surging.
Like today, in the beginning of the 1930s there was one major economy bestowed with
prolonged large current account surpluses and low unemployment. France was deemed
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to act as the locomotive of growth for the rest of the continental Europe.16 Beggar-thy-
neighbour policies were framing the mindset of the economic rulers in France who were
(i) refusing to accept responsibility of their version of mercantilism and its dire e¤ects in
the proximity of Europe, and (ii) in sheer denial of the necessity of expansionary policies
and direct lending to Germany, fearing that they would be throwing good money after
bad. The e¤ect of such an opportunistic and short-sighted French policy was to herald the
enthronement of a populist totalitarian regime that steered the world into the savagery
and traumas of WWII.17
John Maynard Keyness prophetic work, The Economic Consequences of the Peace
([1920]2012), was ignored by the powerhouses of the 1920s and 1930s. In his capacity as
the o¢ cial representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919,
J. M. Keynes felt compelled to resign when it became clear to him that there was no
hope for substantial modications in the draft Terms of Peace. In his diatribe, he lays
the ground of his objection to the Treaty, and dedicates his book to the formation of the
general opinion of the future(ib., p.77). The following extract is revealing.
...with every one owing every one else immense sums of money. Germany owes a
large sum to the Allies; the Allies owe a large sum to Great Britain; and Great Britain
owes a large sum to the United States. The holders of war loan in every country are owed
a large sum by the State; and the State in its turn is owed a large sum by these and
other taxpayers. The whole position is in the highest degree articial, misleading, and
vexatious. We shall never be able to move again, unless we can free our limbs from these
paper shackles. A general bonre is so great a necessity that unless we can make of it an
orderly and good-tempered a¤air...it will, when it comes at last, grow into a conagration
that may destroy much else as well(ib., p.73). How pertinent and topical for the current
malaises of the Eurozone is his nearly 100 years old conviction for a collective reordering
of debts and the necessity for adopting a new economic paradigm.
16France returned to the gold standard in 1928 - by 1932 French gold had risen from 12% to 28% of
the world reserves. Notably, when Greece required nancial assistance to overcome the dire straits of
that period, the French delegate advocated closing schools and cutting the salaries of public employees
by 20 percent(Bloomberg, 2012)
17Mourés (2002) study is enlightening: ...the rhetoric of the gold standard, with its claims for au-
tomatic adjustment and a natural regulation of prices and external balance, is argued to have con-
tributed signicantly to misperceptions of the economic problems of the inter-war period, producing
mis-prescriptions in order to resolve them. In this sense, gold standard rhetoric misled inter-war policy,
with the Great Depression of the 1930s part of the price paid for the gold standard illusion(ib., p.15).
The point made by Mouré is that even if a structurally awed gold standard system pushed inter-war
economies towards major slumps (as Eichengreen, 1995, argues in the Golden Fettersanalysis), policy
prescriptions played a crucial role in the timing and severity of the depression.
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7 Conclusions
Economic convergence together with shared and inclusive growth were perceived as the
intrinsic features of a brave new worldin the Eurozone. Within a decade of its creation
and in the aftermath of the Great Recession, scal retrenchment has being undersigned
as the sole recipe for the economic survival of the union. The Eurozone at present, given
its marked imbalances and asymetric economic performance of its member states since its
creation, reminisces more a xed exchange rate area with a shared currency than a true
monetary union with a common currency.
This paper addressed the awed neoliberal economics of the architecture behind the
bailout plans for Greece and the accute geoeconomic impact of a series of erce
austerity programmes. We ellaborated on the relevance for explaining the Eu-
rozones woes in general and Greeces perilous condition in particular, of the
two key perspectives on neoliberalism in heterodox political economy and
within the eld of economic geography, namely the Marxian one and the
broadly Polyanian one. We employed Peck, Theodore, and Brenners (2012)
understanding of neoliberalism as market disciplinary regulatory restructur-
ing. We corroborated to the argument that it is this disciplinary impulse that,
in Polanyis model, gives the Euro project its chimerical character, due to the
political impossibility of allowing the societies of the member states to be
transformed into heap of ruins(Polanyi (1944[2001], pp.202) by the sanc-
tion of hunger (Polanyi (1944[2001], pp.123), although both testaments, as
we demonstrated, are tested to the limit in the case of Greece. The end result
is an inevitable coupling of market disciplinary reforms (e.g., the inception of
the Euro) to the growth of nancial backstopping institutions which provide
state-funded security (e.g., European Stability Mechanism (ESM), European
Stability Fund (ESF)), in other words an expansion of big-government nance
under the auspices of small-government ideology, in an escalating cycle of cri-
sis and crisis interventions.We further attested to the observation made by
Brenner, Peck and Theodore (2010) that neoliberalism is also characterized
by a counterintuitive and perverse dynamic whereby its continued expansion
is actually fueled by its own catastrophic failures.
We proceeded by documenting ,for the rst time in the literature, that the com-
position of the soaring Greek debt and most importantly its use was not to beneting
a "proigate" Greek state but rather overwhelmingly to avoiding the writedowns of bad
loans made by reckless creditors (mainly, German and French banks) to the Greek gov-
ernment and to the Greek systemic banks. We viewed this destabilizing conduct
by the Eurozones economic elites as a form of what Harvey(2005) called "ac-
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cumulation by dispossession". We nally o¤ered our proposals for a temporary
resolution of the Greek drama, whilst Greece o¢ cially stays in the Eurozone, primarily
via the adoption of a parallel currency.
A credible and comprehensive "Plan B" of a complementary currency-along with the
Euro-together with rm demands for legitimate substantial write-o¤s of public debt (the
Maastricht criterion points to 60% sovereign debt as a fraction of GDP) for ailing mem-
ber states may (i) avert the disintregration of the Eurozone and, ultimately the end of
the Euro (similar to the Gold standard), (ii) re-orientate economic policies away from
the conict-ridden, unstustainable and perverse dynamics of neoliberalism whereby its
continued expansion is actually fuelled but its own catastrophic failures, and (iii) halt
the alarming ascendancy of anti-Euro/EU populism and its copious rhetoric of attribut-
ing the socioeconomic malices of large scale inequality and unemployment/casualization
of the labour force on intra- Euroland/EU immigration from poorer to richer countries
rather than on the malevolent form of contemporary capitalism.
Dealing with the fallacy of composition, where the collective austerity programmes and
deleveraging of the private sector together with unconventional monetary policies such as
quantitative easing are the roadmap to rescue the Eurozone as a whole, and Greece
in particular, from its macroeconomic downhill, self-defeating internal devaluations and
disintegration, the views of two of the most prominent scholars sitting on di¤erent ends
of the economic spectrum are compelling.
On the liberal side, the 1930s Chicago School economist Henry C. Simons argued that
For the moment, however, attention must be focused on the task of escaping from the
present a­ iction of extreme unemployment and underproduction. Unless the immediate
crisis can be dealt with, there is no sense in talking about long-run policy. ...consequently,
main reliance must be placed on "reationary" government spending. ... Inationary scal
policy is dangerous, to be sure - but not so dangerous as the alternatives. ..Measures of this
kind must be undertaken, merely to keep running a system which banking and monopoly
have brought to its present plight(Simons, [1934]1948, p.74). On the Keynesian side,
John Maynard Keynes ([1920]2012) policy recommendations for a collective reordering of
debts and re-orientation of the economic mindset were ignored by the powerhouses of the
1920s and 1930s.
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